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Abstract: Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an architecture for computer networking that 
provides a clear separation between network control functions and forwarding operations. The 
abstractions supported by this architecture are intended to simplify the implementation of several 
tasks that are critical to network operation, such as routing and network management. Computer 
networks have an increasingly important societal role, requiring them to be resilient to a range of 
challenges. Previously, research into network resilience has focused on the mitigation of several types 
of challenges, such as natural disasters and attacks. Capitalising on its benefits, including increased 
programmability and a clearer separation of concerns, significant attention has recently focused on the 
development of resilience mechanisms that use software-defined networking approaches. In this 
article, we present a survey that provides a structured overview of the resilience support that 
currently exists in this important area. We categorize the most recent research on this topic with 
respect to a number of resilience disciplines. Additionally, we discuss the lessons learned from this 
investigation, highlight the main challenges faced by SDNs moving forward, and outline the research 
trends in terms of solutions to mitigate these challenges. 
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Dear Editors-in-Chief, 
Please consider our article, entitled “Resilience Support in Software-Defined 
Networking: A Survey”, for publication in Computer Networks. 
This article presents a survey on the support for network resilience in Software-
Defined Networking (SDN). This has been the subject of intense investigation by the 
academic and industrial community in the past few years, as evidenced by the number 
of papers included in our survey (159 references in total). Capitalizing on the benefits 
of SDN, including increased programmability and a clearer separation of concerns, 
significant attention has recently focused on the development of resilience 
mechanisms that use software-defined networking approaches. Thus, a wide range of 
solutions to classical network problems have been revisited using this architecture, but 
many problems continue to be challenging.  
Our survey investigates the resilience support that currently exists in this important 
area, and categorizes the most recent research on this topic with respect to a number 
of resilience disciplines. Additionally, we discuss the lessons learned from this 
investigation, highlight the main challenges faced by SDNs moving forward, and 
outline the research trends in terms of solutions to mitigate these challenges. The aim 
of the survey is to offer to the reader a structured view of network resilience in the 
SDN spectrum, and how resilience aspects are supported in these architectures. 
We believe that this subject material is closely aligned with the objectives of the 
journal. Please be assured that: 
1. This paper has not been published or accepted for publication with other 
targets; and 
2. The contents of this manuscript will not be submitted elsewhere while 
acceptance by Computer Networks is under consideration. 
We look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.  
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Anderson Santos da Silva, UFRGS, Brazil (Corresponding Author)  
Paul Smith, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria 
Andreas Mauthe, Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
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Dear Editors, 
 
We would like to thank the reviewers and the editors for their positive feedback. We would also like to 
thank you for the promptness of the review process. Please find below our replies to the minor 
revisions that were requested: 
 
Reviewer #1: 
 
The paper is a good survey. However, some issue should be addressed prior to publication. 
>>> We would like to thank the reviewer for the positive feedback. 
 
You insert energy issues in the disruption tolerance framework (page 4 and page 15). This looks really 
questionable to me. In my understanding energy issues exists in almost all the discussed areas. Thus, 
they me discussed in all sections or could be treated in a separate section. Otherwise it should be 
clarified to which energy issues you are referring to and why. 
>>> We insert energy issues within the Disruption Tolerance discipline following accordance with the 
taxonomy on network resilience and challenges proposed by Sterbenz et al [7]. According with this 
taxonomy, the consequence of challenges associated with energy issues is link disruptions, and the 
most studied aspects about energy include (i) optimization of energy consumption in the network and 
(ii) network resilience when power outages occur. However, we agree with the reviewer that the 
subsection on energy should be clarified with respect to the specific energy issues relevant in this 
context. Thus, we added the following paragraph to Section 3.6 (page 15):  
"The most studied topics about energy include optimization of energy consumption in the network and 
network resilience when power outages occur. The consequence of challenges associated with energy 
issues is link disruption. Thus, although energy issues are relevant in other disciplines discussed in this 
survey, these aspects are mostly related to ensuring connectivity among devices and disruption 
tolerance [7]." 
 
Page 3 left column. Is the description of the process of what happens to a packet (dropped, flooded, 
sent to) in the data plane paragraph really needed? Also, immediately after, the statistical information 
are stored per flow, not per packet. 
>>> By giving examples of typical actions that the Data Plane offers to the Control Plane we want to 
help the reader to get a better understanding of the issues even if they are not expert. The goal is to 
illustrate the programmability offered by SDN, a concept that many studies use in their resilience 
solutions. Though, we fully agree with the reviewer regarding the need to clarify that the statistical 
information is stored per flow. The corrected sentence is (Page 3):  
“For every flow the switches involved in this communication store statistical information that can be 
accessed by the control plane.” 
 
Page 3, right column. In the first sentence of Section 2.2, listing social media as societally critical is a 
little questionable. Rephrase more clearly. 
>>> We agree that "social media" does not fit with the "critical functions" argument. We rephrased this 
sentence by removing any reference to social media. 
 
Page 6. Stating that Heller and Canini address similar issues is not really useful. Either explain better 
the difference or merge with the previous citations. 
Revision Letter
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
>>> As requested by the reviewer we explained better the difference between these approaches. The 
revised text is:  
“Heller et al. [32] discuss the overall problem space regarding troubleshooting in SDN but the authors 
do not propose any system or framework. Scott et al. [34] also deal with this aspect and in addition 
propose a troubleshooting system (called STS), which aims to alleviate the time-consuming nature of 
debugging by eliminating events that are not causally related to the source of a failure. Further, Canini 
et al. [33] are also concerned with troubleshooting issues, and apply model-checking techniques to 
represent the state space of the network. This strategy is useful to detect design flaws, a frequent type 
of software bug.” 
  
Page 7, top of right column. Why citing here issues discussed in Sec 3.4 and 3.6? It is rather confusing. 
>>> We agree that this was rather confusing. Our goal was to indicate to the reader where related 
concepts would appear in subsequent subsections. Following the suggestion of the reviewer we 
removed these forward references to subsequent sections. 
 
The bibliography style can be improved (it is already good!). 
A Section tile bibliography is missing. 
Write SDN in caps in all the refs! 
Ref [2] is a book or a Journal? 
Ref [3] should be completed. 
Ref [22] and [24] journal is missing. 
Ref [135] should be completed. 
>>> All these issues have been fixed. 
 
There are some mispells in the paper. Please double check. 
>>> We thoroughly revised the paper. 
 
Reviewer #3: 
 
The paper addresses a very interesting and timely topic. It is very well written and, what I find more 
relevant, it is a useful piece of work for any researcher interested in the SDN area. 
>>> We also would like to thank this reviewer for the positive feedback. 
 
Since I think it is a very nice paper, I just have a minor set of questions/comments (in no particular 
order): 
 
In Figure 1: would it be possible to visually show also for each year what is the amount of papers 
related to each of the challenges identified? It would provide useful information on what are the hottest 
areas now. 
>>> We updated Figure 1 to include the information requested by the reviewer.  We used grey tones to 
represent each resilience discipline, and the plot now shows the number of papers per year related to 
each discipline. 
 
SDN is a paradigm, that is then composed of many pieces, protocols. It seems that the paper is too 
much OpenFlow oriented, which is the most well-known approach of southbound protocol. Some text 
explaining to which extent the paper (i.e., the research done so far) is OpenFlow-specific would help. 
Are there any proposal for ForCES, for example? how do the identified challenges apply to other 
protocols? are the challenges generic enough to apply to other protocols? are there any OpenFlow 
specific concerns? 
>>> We revised the manuscript and in the appropriate places we emphasize when a given resilience 
challenge is specific to OpenFlow. Further, in our investigation we were not able to find resilience 
mechanisms available in less popular SDN protocols, such as ForCES. For this reason we concentrated 
our work on OpenFlow. Finally we clarified the issue about generic and specific challenges by 
inserting the following text in Section IV (page 17):  
"Ultimately, the resilience challenges observed can be divided into two classes. The first class refers to 
challenges related to the SDN architecture itself independently of any given implementation (e.g., 
related to infrastructure planning and network measurement). For example, the controller placement is 
a theoretical problem that is relevant regardless of the controller implementation. The second class 
subsumes resilience challenges that depend on specific SDN implementations (e.g., routing and 
security applications). In this case, the solutions in the literature are frequently based on the 
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OpenFlow specification or highly dependent on the functionality provided by the controller 
implementation." 
The papers are classified according to SDN planes. Would it be possible to comment something 
according to APIs? 
>>> Our initial proposal was to include the SDN communication interfaces in our taxonomy. However, 
there is no standard defined for the Northbound API and few studies focus on the study of the 
Southbound API alone. For this reason, we attempted to fit existing research efforts within the SDN 
planes (application, control, and data) rather than APIs. 
 
The text in page 8, paragraph before Availability is not clear and I suggest rewriting it. 
>>> We rewrote the paragraph as suggested by the reviewer:  
“Historically the deployment of complex security functions (e.g., intrusion detection systems and 
firewalls) has required the installation of dedicated security appliances. For some organizations the 
costs and management issues related to these deployments can be prohibitive. Additionally, in 
traditional networks the lack of a centralized control of these security functions can further complicate 
their deployment [61]. In contrast, SDN enables the implementation of applications that have the 
ability to support similar security functions in a much more flexible manner, and it offers a suitable 
place for the implementation of more accurate, reliable and efficient security solutions. Table 3 
presents the major research efforts addressing security in SDN. In the following we discuss these in 
detail.” 
 
Since SDN is about software, many of the challenges may be related/due to the actual implementation 
of the mechanism. The paper partially tackles this issue on the concluding part, but I think this 
deserves more text. 
>>> We fully agree with the reviewer and address this issue in part in the comment above in which we 
make a clear distinctions between aspects related to SDN itself or to the actual 
implementation/protocol. But to make this point stronger, we also inserted the following text in the 
Concluding Remarks section (page 18):  
“We emphasize that many of the resilience challenges are due to limitations in the implementation of 
the components used to realize the SDN paradigm. For example, (i) the OpenFlow protocol can be 
unsafe if TLS is not set up correctly; (ii) the Floodlight controller exposes almost all of its functionality 
through a REST API (possibly allowing illegitimate applications to gather network data); and (iii) the 
listener mode functionality (present in many OpenFlow switches) may allow the establishment of 
connections in a pre-configured port without authentication.” 
 
There are some mobility related works not considered. For example, in the IETF there have been some 
additional proposals. 
>>> We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. We inserted references related to mobility related 
works in the IETF, and some additional works that comment on the current proposals. The following 
text was added to the paper (page 15):  
“SDN offers an opportunity to facilitate the treatment of challenges in mobile networks, such as 
mobility management. Traditional solutions present limitations related to, for example, routing and the 
continuity of active sessions. The use of decentralized device anchors represents an alternative to 
address these limitations. Further, the use of DMM (Distributed Mobility Management) in SDN has 
been advocated by Sperotto [152] and in IETF proposals [153, 154, 155]. SDN can assist in mitigating 
these issues as it provides a flexible architecture for the deployment of network protocols and 
applications.” 
 
Minor nits: "can subjected" --> "can be subjected", "MPtcp" --> "MP-TCP", "Openflow" --> 
"OpenFlow", many references are missing some capital letters in the title of the papers (I guess is due 
to some missing "" in the LaTeX bib file). 
>>> All these issues have been fixed. 
 
We thank again the editor and the reviewers for their valuable feedback.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
Anderson Santos da Silva, UFRGS, Brazil (Corresponding Author)  
Paul Smith, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria 
Andreas Mauthe, Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
Alberto Schaeffer-Filho, UFRGS, Brazil 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Resilience Support in Software-Defined Networking: A Survey
Anderson Santos da Silvaa,∗, Paul Smithb, Andreas Mauthec, Alberto Schaeffer-Filhoa
aInstitute of Informatics, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
bSafety and Security Department, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria
cSchool of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, United Kingdom
Abstract
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an architecture for computer networking that provides a clear separation
between network control functions and forwarding operations. The abstractions supported by this architecture are
intended to simplify the implementation of several tasks that are critical to network operation, such as routing and
network management. Computer networks have an increasingly important societal role, requiring them to be resilient
to a range of challenges. Previously, research into network resilience has focused on the mitigation of several types
of challenges, such as natural disasters and attacks. Capitalizing on its benefits, including increased programmability
and a clearer separation of concerns, significant attention has recently focused on the development of resilience mech-
anisms that use software-defined networking approaches. In this article, we present a survey that provides a structured
overview of the resilience support that currently exists in this important area. We categorize the most recent research
on this topic with respect to a number of resilience disciplines. Additionally, we discuss the lessons learned from this
investigation, highlight the main challenges faced by SDNs moving forward, and outline the research trends in terms
of solutions to mitigate these challenges.
Keywords: Software-defined networking; network resilience; OpenFlow; network challenges.
1. Introduction
Computer networks are important for businesses and
to support the operation of societally critical infrastruc-
tures, such as future (smart) electrical grids and gov-
ernment services. The growth in number and variety
of end-to-end services that networks must support has
led to a great deal of heterogeneity in the way net-
works are implemented, resulting in (i) complex pro-
tocols to handle the communication between network
devices [1], (ii) difficult deployment of network policies
by network administrators [2] and (iii) limited routing
scalability [3, 4, 5]. Additionally, challenges to normal
network operation, such as malicious attacks and pro-
hibitive communication delay, demonstrate that com-
puter networks have long-standing resilience require-
ments [6].
Resilience is the ability of the network to maintain
an acceptable level of service when confronted with
∗Corresponding author.
Email addresses: assilva@inf.ufrgs.br (Anderson Santos
da Silva), paul.smith@ait.ac.at (Paul Smith),
a.mauthe@lancaster.ac.uk (Andreas Mauthe),
alberto@inf.ufrgs.br (Alberto Schaeffer-Filho)
operational challenges [7]. A challenge is an atypical
event that hinders the expected normal network opera-
tion [6, 8]. In order to deal with a wide range of chal-
lenges, network resilience encompasses six major dis-
ciplines: security, survivability (including fault toler-
ance), performability, traffic tolerance, disruption toler-
ance and dependability [7]. When a network challenge
arises, mitigation mechanisms should be activated, ide-
ally without human intervention, to rapidly protect a
network and the services it supports. However, the
broad range of potential challenges that could befall
a network requires sophisticated network (resilience)
management systems that can detect and mitigate their
effects [8]. Existing management systems have limita-
tions, including a lack of flexibility with respect to chal-
lenge identification and mitigation, which has encour-
aged research that considers this problem in the context
of new network architectures [9].
In both the research and industry communities,
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [10] has recently
gained significant attention. The main characteristic of
the SDN architecture is that it decouples the implemen-
tation of network control logic from forwarding oper-
Preprint submitted to Computer Networks July 30, 2015
*Article
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ations, thus enabling more flexible network control and
management. In this context, a centralized control plane
determines how forwarding devices, such as switches,
will behave by configuring them using standardized pro-
tocols, such as OpenFlow [11]. The SDN architecture
and the OpenFlow protocol, as its canonical implemen-
tation, offer (i) a comprehensive view of the network
that is centralized in the control plane, (ii) high-levels of
programmability of network applications, and (iii) fine-
grained flow monitoring. These properties can be used
to support the implementation of resilience mechanisms
and help to minimize the complexity of managing them
for network operators. Despite these benefits, new re-
silience challenges can arise because of the use of SDN,
e.g., with respect to the fault tolerance of the control
plane; research into addressing these issues is currently
a major concern.
This paper presents a survey on the support for net-
work resilience in software-defined networking. Re-
search into this topic has recently intensified, as illus-
trated in Figure 1, which summarizes the number of re-
search papers addressing resilience aspects in SDN in-
cluded in this survey, according to their year of publi-
cation. We organize the literature surveyed using the
resilience taxonomy proposed by Sterbenz et al. [7],
thus enabling a reliable categorization of the existing
research efforts on SDN. Our survey discusses aspects
such as existing solutions for resilience challenges, cur-
rent open issues and research trends in this field. The
aim of the survey is to present to the reader a com-
prehensive and structured view of network resilience in
the SDN spectrum, and how resilience aspects are sup-
ported in these architectures.
We have observed that solutions related to fault man-
agement, infrastructure planning, routing and security
applications, network measurement and anomaly detec-
tion are frequently used to address resilience challenges
in the SDN context. However, we have identified sev-
eral open issues in this research space, including the
protection of the communication channel between net-
work controller and forwarding devices; adequate sup-
port for sophisticated QoS solutions to enhance per-
formability; and the need to detect novel malicious at-
tacks targeting network devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents necessary background material on
SDN and network resilience. Section III discusses the
proposed categorization of SDN efforts, with respect to
different resilience disciplines. Section IV shows a sum-
mary of the main research topics studied, topics already
solved and others under investigation. Finally, Section
V presents the concluding remarks.
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Figure 1: Number of research papers included in this survey, accord-
ing to their year of publication
2. Background
This section discusses the basic concepts and ter-
minology used in this work. In particular, Software-
defined networking and network resilience are contex-
tualized.
2.1. Software-Defined Networking
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an architec-
ture for computer networks aimed at decoupling the
network control functions (control plane) from the for-
warding devices (data plane) [10]. The control plane is
responsible for determining the network control logic,
such as implementing routing protocols. The aim of the
SDN architecture is to simplify the deployment of new
control plane functions, such as routing strategies, when
compared to traditional networks [12, 13], in which the
control and data planes are more tightly coupled and
typically operate in an entirely distributed fashion.
The SDN architecture defines three conceptual planes
and communication interfaces as depicted in Figure 2:
• The application plane is responsible for executing
applications that run over the network infrastruc-
ture. Generally, these applications perform modifi-
cations regarding network aspects, such as network
policies and routing behavior, with some degree of
human intervention [12]. Examples of network ap-
plications deployed in this plane are network visu-
alization, path reservation and network provision-
ing;
2
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Figure 2: SDN architecture: conceptual planes and communication interfaces
• The control plane defines control logic, such as
routing schemes. Additionally, the control plane
can manage the information collected by switches
at the data plane, such as flow statistics, to orches-
trate the traffic behavior. This plane has a global
network view, being able to offer mechanisms for
fault diagnosis, make decisions over current traffic
distributions and enforce QoS policies. Usually,
the control plane is physically distributed into con-
troller devices, but logically centralized [14];
• The data plane includes the devices that are re-
sponsible for forwarding data, which are generally
referred to as switches. An OpenFlow switch of-
fers the notion of programmable flow tables, i.e.,
tables that define an action for each packet associ-
ated with a specified flow. A flow table can be dy-
namically configured by the control plane. When
a new packet arrives in a given switch it can be
(i) dropped; (ii) flooded through all output ports;
(iii) sent to a specific output port; or (iv) sent to
the network controller [15]. For every flow the
switches involved in this communication store sta-
tistical information that can be accessed by the
control plane.
Furthermore, the communication between the differ-
ent planes occurs through the following interfaces:
• Northbound API: Implements the communication
interface between the control plane and the appli-
cation plane. This API enables the programmabil-
ity of the network controller by exposing network
data abstractions to the application plane. Cur-
rently, the most used protocol for this communi-
cation is REST (REpresentational State Transfer);
• Southbound API: Implements the communication
interface between the control plane and the data
plane. Through this interface it is possible for the
control plane to configure switches with forward-
ing actions according to received notifications of
incoming packets from the data plane [16]. This
is typically standardized and implemented by the
OpenFlow protocol [11, 17].
It can be seen that through these interfaces the SDN
architecture introduces a great deal of flexibility in flow
management, impacting directly in areas such as se-
curity, traffic management and performability [18, 19].
Also, SDN has the potential to reduce the cost of
network deployment, because simplified data plane
switches are relatively inexpensive components, when
compared to more complex routers [20]. Furthermore,
OpenFlow has proven to be ideal for the development of
prototype network applications [21]; based on this suc-
cess, research in this field has increased [22]. These
characteristics generated enthusiasm in both industry
and academia. Many surveys covering historical as-
pects, architecture and challenges related to SDN have
been published and further discussions can be found
in [23, 24, 25, 12].
2.2. Network Resilience
Computer networks support many societally critical
functions such as business transactions, military opera-
tions and electricity supply. However, a wide range of
3
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challenges such as malicious attacks, operational over-
load and mis-configurations can occur, which could re-
sult in failures. Additionally, networked systems can in-
clude hardware and software faults that could similarly
result in failures, if triggered. Approaches to network
resilience aim to protect the network and overcome a
degradation in the performance of services when con-
fronted with challenges and faults.
2.2.1. General Principles
There are a number of different ways in which a net-
work can fail to provide a desired level of service, such
as a given end-to-end delay or level of availability. Fail-
ures can be caused by so-called challenges, such as a
malicious attack or natural disaster, or a fault. For ex-
ample, critical failures resulting from natural disasters
like Hurricane Katrina [26], in 2005, destroyed much
of the network infrastructure on the east coast of the
United States. The damage was such that communica-
tion links were interrupted and the electrical distribution
system was compromised. Furthermore, our increasing
dependence on network infrastructures has attracted the
attention of cyber criminals. These individuals aim to
disrupt the operation of large corporations or even na-
tions through cyber-attacks that are targeted at the com-
munication infrastructure [27]. In this case, a failure
is the result of deliberate malicious activities that can
compromise a target network service.
The variety of ways that networks can be challenged
creates the need for a wide range of resilience mecha-
nisms, which should be deployed across systems, net-
work layers and infrastructures, as necessary. Unfor-
tunately, an ideal resilience system that is capable of
protecting the network from any challenge in any envi-
ronment is difficult to achieve and expensive. A trade-
off between the complexity of the mechanisms and their
cost exists, and this restriction defines what can be de-
ployed in practice [28]. Consequently, prohibitive costs
can make ideal resilience solutions, such as fully fault
tolerant systems, infeasible [20].
In general, a number of stages can be implemented
to ensure the resilience of networks [7, 29]. Initially a
set of defense mechanisms should be deployed that ad-
dress the known challenges a network may face; these
might include firewalls or redundant network paths, for
example. In some cases, these defense measures will
fail, e.g., because new challenges emerge or they are in-
sufficiently provisioned. Consequently, it is important
to detect challenges and service degradation, and subse-
quently diagnose the root cause of a challenge. Using
the outcomes from these stages, mechanisms to remedi-
ate the challenge can be used to adapt the system oper-
ation, in order to ensure continued or graceful degrada-
tion of service. For example, suspicious network traf-
fic can be subjected to deep-packet inspection (a form
of detection and diagnosis), while malicious traffic can
be blocked (a remedial action). Finally, when a chal-
lenge has abated, the network should recover to normal
operation by disengaging remediation mechanisms, for
example.
2.2.2. Resilience Disciplines
In this section, we discuss the resilience disciplines
that are related to networked systems. According to
Sterbenz et al. [7], a number of existing disciplines ad-
dress aspects of network resilience, which can be placed
into two categories: (i) disciplines that provide mech-
anisms to address different classes of challenges and
faults; and (ii) those specifying measurable properties
that indicate the resilience of a network. We summarize
these disciplines:
• Survivability: is a superset of fault tolerance,
which addresses small numbers of random uncor-
related faults, by considering numerous correlated
failures that could be caused by challenges such
as malicious attacks and large-scale natural disas-
ters. While redundancy is often considered suffi-
cient for fault tolerance, ensuring the survivability
of networks requires approaches to diversity to be
implemented;
• Traffic tolerance: enables the network to toler-
ate unusual traffic load without interrupting its op-
eration. It deals with legitimate traffic manage-
ment, e.g., flash crowds, largely via traffic engi-
neering mechanisms. However, DDoS attacks can
behave similarly to legitimate traffic, thus creating
the need to identify and treat this type of traffic in
a specific manner;
• Disruption tolerance: enables the network to tol-
erate weak and episodic connectivity that is typi-
cal of mobile and wireless networks. Approaches
to disruption tolerance can include error correc-
tion schemes, multi-path routing and in extreme
cases (e.g., for mobile ad hoc networks) store-
carry-forward schemes. Often in this context, there
are energy trade-offs that need to be addressed;
• Dependability: quantifies the reliance that can be
placed on the service delivered by a system. Con-
sequently, this definition encompasses concepts re-
lated to availability – an indicator of whether a ser-
vice will be present when requested – and reliabil-
4
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Table 1: SDN research efforts on Fault Tolerance and Survivability
SDN Planes Fault Tolerance Survivability
Application plane Reitblatt et al. [30] Chandrasekaran et al. [31]
Heller et al. [32]
Canini et al. [33]
Scott et al. [34]
Control plane Jain et al. [35] Williams et al. [36]
Botelho et al. [37] Liu et al. [38]
Jian et al. [39] Kempf et al. [40]
Fonseca et al. [41] Chandrasekaran et al. [31]
Tootoonchina et al. [42] Muller et al. [43]
Zhang et al. [44]
Data plane Jain et al. [35] Liu et al. [38]
Botelho et al. [37] Kempf et al. [40]
ity – a measure of continued operation for a spec-
ified period of time. Also, dependability relates to
measures of safety, integrity and maintainability;
• Security: is a property and set of measures that
relate to unauthorized access to a networked sys-
tem, and includes notions of self-protection. It in-
cludes concepts such as confidentiality, nonrepu-
diality and AAA (auditability, authorizability, au-
thenticity). Additionally, security properties inter-
sect with the dependability concepts of availability
and integrity, with subtly different semantics – for
security, these properties typically relate to infor-
mation assets, rather than services.
• Performability: metrics describe the network’s
ability to deliver the performance required by its
users; these requirements are normally expressed
in Quality of Service (QoS) agreements. Typ-
ical performability metrics include delay, jitter,
throughput and goodput, for example.
3. State-of-art in SDN Resilience
This section discusses the main research efforts that
have addressed resilience aspects in the context of SDN.
The methodology employed to produce this survey is as
follows. First, a total of 142 research papers and techni-
cal reports on SDN and resilience were gathered, based
on criteria such as date and relevance. Second, the pub-
lications were categorized into the different resilience
disciplines that are proposed by Sterbenz et al. [7] (see
Sec. 2). Third, these works were arranged into one or
more SDN planes (Figure 2), in order to provide a high-
level view of the intended resilience support over the
different planes. In the following, for each resilience
discipline, we discuss the main challenges and the so-
lutions used to protect the network in SDN environ-
ments. Despite our efforts to accurately categorize the
publications within the several resilience disciplines, we
acknowledge that in some cases the same publication
could be classified differently according to the assess-
ment of the reader.
3.1. Fault Tolerance and Survivability
A natural concern about the SDN architecture is the
survivability of the network controller, forwarding de-
vices in the data plane and applications that monitor and
change the network operation. To achieve the protec-
tion of these components, survivability encompasses the
treatment of fault tolerance in the face of uncorrelated
failures that are caused by faults, and multiple corre-
lated failures that are caused by natural disasters and at-
tacks, for example. Table 1 presents the major research
efforts addressing survivability in SDN. In the following
we discuss these works in detail.
Fault tolerance: is the ability of a system to provide
continued operation or degrade gracefully in the pres-
ence of faults. The classical approach to fault tolerance
is to introduce redundancy into the system, e.g., through
the use of replicas to protect critical components in the
network [45]. In the SDN context, redundancy can be
used to (i) protect the network controller from service
failures, (ii) to protect the forwarding devices and com-
munication links from link disruption, and (iii) to pro-
tect network applications from misconfiguration [44].
Despite the benefits of fault tolerance, a fully fault toler-
ant system brings complex issues that are related to the
management of replicated components and equipment
costs. SDN can help to address these issues because its
architecture can accommodate the control of complex
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network functions. For example, the control plane can
be used to orchestrate the behavior of active and redun-
dant devices, eliminating the need for new devices to
perform such tasks [41].
Jain et al. [35] relate experience with the use of fault
tolerant approaches to address network outages and fail-
ures with B4, a private WAN that connects the Google’s
data center. They used OpenFlow to manage individual
switches that implement several fault tolerance tasks,
such as multipath routing regarding flow priority and
dynamic reallocation of bandwidth when link failures
occur. The redundancy is achieved using software repli-
cas to protect individual and control processes in the
control plane. These replicas are placed on different
physical servers and, in case of network faults, a con-
sensus algorithm can be used to elect the replica that
will assume the demand of the network. All the configu-
rations and communications used to protect the network
are assisted by an SDN-based architecture.
Botelho et al. [37] treats the consistency between a
network controller and their redundant backups, focus-
ing on performance aspects. The main conclusion of the
authors is that strict consistency and fault tolerant sys-
tems can operate with acceptable performance. How-
ever, issues related to latency were shown to limit the
responsiveness of the system. Jian et al. [39] confirm
this observation and show that the performance of the
network controller can be critical to link failure detec-
tion, even in fault tolerant systems.
We understand that a large number of applications
that are related to fault tolerance running in the control
plane can reduce its capacity to process network traf-
fic. A solution to tackle this limitation is moving the
majority of these applications to the application plane,
which is more scalable and suitable for running these
tasks mainly because this plane is designed exclusively
to support the execution of general SDN applications.
Using the programmability offered by the SDN archi-
tecture, Reitblatt et al. [30] propose FatTire, a language
for writing fault-tolerant systems. The idea behind this
approach is to offer an abstraction for network paths,
such that the forwarding behavior of network packets
can be orchestrated though regular expressions that are
converted into primitive switch rules. This is an ap-
plication plane solution, and can be updated according
to the need of new resilience requirements. Further-
more, Fonseca et al. [41] investigate the redundancy
of network controllers. Related to this is the work by
Tootoonchian et al. [42], which deals with the distribu-
tion of controller state over the network, in order to offer
a logically centralized network controller.
A recent concern involves the programmability of-
fered by SDN and the challenges related to software
debugging. In our understanding these issues also
bear some relationship to Fault Tolerance. Heller et
al. [32] discuss the overall problem space regarding
troubleshooting in SDN but the authors do not propose
any system or framework. Scott et al. [34] also deal with
this aspect and in addition propose a troubleshooting
system (called STS), which aims to alleviate the time-
consuming nature of debugging by eliminating events
that are not causally related to the source of a fail-
ure. Further, Canini et al. [33] are also concerned with
troubleshooting issues, and apply model-checking tech-
niques to represent the state space of the network. This
strategy is useful to detect design flaws, a frequent type
of software bug.
Survivability: multiple, uncorrelated failures can be
unpredictable and difficult to diagnose, and in this case
redundancy may not be enough. A typical strategy to
handle this kind of failures is diversity, i.e., to use a set
of distinct resilience schemes to determine and treat the
source of failure. This increases the success of detec-
tion/mitigation schemes because a wide-range of net-
work challenges can be addressed.
For example, diversity can be typically employed
to withstand catastrophic faults, such as natural disas-
ters. Muller et al. [43] highlight that even if the control
and data planes are compromised, different placement
strategies of the network controller, path diversity and
distinct recovery mechanisms can be used to ensure that
the network can still function. Note that similar tech-
niques can be used not only to improve aspects related
to Survivability but also to Disruption Tolerance.
Chandrasekaran et al. [31] discuss how to handle
challenges at the application and control planes. Their
focus is to treat Byzantine failures, fail-stop crashes
and other uncorrelated failures. They propose two ab-
stractions for improving the network controller avail-
ability and diagnose network application faults: a mod-
ule used for fault isolation and another to deal with net-
work transactions. The joint operation of these com-
ponents enables the orchestration of high-level applica-
tions, such as fault alerts and the specification of poli-
cies to enforce actions when failures occur. The pro-
posed framework still enables the distribution of net-
work events to different SDN applications, in order to
tolerate multiple, uncorrelated failures.
SDN is a suitable environment to investigate diver-
sity of automatic recovery mechanisms. For example,
mechanisms used to plan for failure can be placed in
distinct network controllers [36], and control plane ap-
plications can be used to ensure path reservation in
the data plane [38]. Related to these ideas, Kempf et
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Table 2: SDN research efforts on Dependability
SDN Planes Reliability Availability
Application plane N/A N/A
Control plane Veisllari et al. [46] Heller et al. [47]
Deguo et al. [48] Hock et al. [49]
Ros et al.[50] Beheshti et al. [51]
Santos et al. [52]
Dixit et al. [53]
Data plane N/A N/A
al. [40] highlight that fault management in SDN cannot
be left to be fully implemented in the control plane, and
instead delegates these tasks to the OpenFlow switches.
They advocate that some control functions, such as con-
nectivity monitoring, can be placed in the data plane.
Consequently, diversity can be attained if different re-
silience mechanisms are implemented in these switches.
3.2. Dependability
Even if a system fails, it can be considered de-
pendable if failures occur with an expected probability.
Thus, dependability quantifies the reliance that can be
placed on the service delivered by a system. In this
sense, dependability encompasses concepts involving
reliability and maintainability. It is also sometimes re-
lated to safety, availability and integrity1. Table 2 cate-
gorizes the major research efforts related to dependabil-
ity in SDN. These are discussed in the following. Note
that the research papers discussed in this section are all
related to the control plane.
Reliability: Deguo et al. [48] state that the data
plane cannot detect failures in the control plane and
the number of control messages lost when a failure oc-
curs can compromise the forwarding behavior of the
network. A solution broadly accepted to deal with this
challenge is to delegate some network control logic to
the forwarding devices, such as rule cloning and mul-
tipath support [54]. A single point of failure is an-
other reason that contributes to the decentralization of
the control plane [52, 53].
Ros et al. [50] investigate the controller placement
problem with respect to network reliability. The authors
propose a metric called k-terminal-reliability, which is
the probability of having at least one operational path
in the network. The authors can optimize the solution
1Safety and maintainability are rather general properties and to
the best of our knowledge, there are no research efforts in SDN solely
concentrated on these fields. Integrity is related to security and will
be discussed in the next section.
for reliability by formulating the controller placement
problem as a graph optimization problem, and inserting
the k-terminal-reliability as a restriction when searching
for the optimal solution.
The reliability of the data plane can be related to
switches and link state. Metrics such as communica-
tion delay, throughput and latency are frequently used
as indicators of reliability, as these represent expected
values that can or cannot be satisfied at any time.
Availability: this is the probability of a system to
be in a correct state in a given instant. New metrics
that are related to this issue are not currently the focus
intense study, however the controller placement prob-
lem is a research question that is related to availability.
This problem investigates (i) how many controllers are
needed to control a given network and (ii) what is the
best place to position the controller regarding metrics
of availability [47]. The most commonly used metrics
measure the average-case latency, worst-case latency
and the maximization of number of nodes with latency
bound. Hock et al. [49] propose more elaborate metrics,
using latency during controller failures, load imbalance
and inter-controller latency. Beheshti et al. [51] pro-
pose metrics such as the number of protected switches
(switches that can use backup links for the control traf-
fic) and the number of unprotected switches.
3.3. Security
Historically the deployment of complex security
functions (e.g., intrusion detection systems and fire-
walls) has required the installation of dedicated security
appliances. For some organizations the costs and man-
agement issues related to these deployments can be pro-
hibitive. Additionally, in traditional networks the lack
of a centralized control of these security functions can
further complicate their deployment [61]. In contrast,
SDN enables the implementation of applications that
have the ability to support similar security functions in
a much more flexible manner, and it offers a suitable
place for the implementation of more accurate, reliable
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Table 3: SDN research efforts on Security
SDN Planes Confidentiality Availability Integrity Nonrepudiality
Application plane N/A Chen et al. [55] N/A N/A
Wang et al. [56]
Seeber et al. [57]
Tasch et al. [58]
Control plane Benton et al. [59] Li et al. [60] Zaalouk et al. [61] Nayak et al. [62]
Schehlmann et al. [63] Zaalouk et al. [61] Schehlmann et al. [63]
Kreutz et al. [64] Schehlmann et al. [63] Ye et al. [65]
Porras et al. [66] Mazieres et al. [67] Collings et al. [68]
Anwer et al. [69] Chen et al. [55] Hu et al. [70]
Fayazbakhsh et al. [71] Wang et al. [56] Xing et al. [72]
Naous et al. [73] Seeber et al. [57] Kampanakis et al. [74]
Silva et al. [75] Jafarian et al. [76]
Ballard et al. [77] Smeliansky et al. [78]
Schlesinger et al. [79] Abaid et al. [80]
Benton et al. [59]
Shin et al. [81]
Kumar et al. [82]
Li et al. [83]
Qazi et al. [84]
Son et al. [85]
Data plane Kreutz et al. [64] Chen et al. [55] Hu et al. [70] N/A
Shin et al. [81] Wang et al. [56] Xing et al. [72]
Naous et al. [73] Seeber et al. [57] Smeliansky et al. [78]
Qazi et al. [84]
and efficient security solutions. Table 3 presents the ma-
jor research efforts addressing security in SDN. In the
following we discuss these in detail.
Availability: Schehlmann et al. [63] state that the
availability of the network controller can compromise
the correct operation of network functions. To address
the availability aspects of the network controller with re-
spect to security, Li et al. [60] propose a novel SDN ar-
chitecture based on BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerant) [67]
mechanisms to withstand malicious attacks on the con-
trol plane. The authors state that a distributed control
plane can assist in protecting the network mainly be-
cause a single point of attack is avoided. Also, the au-
thors highlight that the additional protection strategies,
such as the use of BFT, can ensure the correct operation
of critical network functions (e.g., flow tables updates).
With a distributed control plane, it is natural to con-
sider the distributed placement of security applications.
However, this can increase the communication delay in
security traversal routing, i.e., the traversal of a given
flow through secure devices to enforce security inspec-
tion. Chen et al. [55] address the security traversal prob-
lem with shortest path solutions, including the ability to
dynamically select the optimal security traversal path.
Cloud environments, for example, can benefit from so-
lutions of this type, since security issues related to com-
munication is critical [57, 56].
It is possible that not only the network controller but
also the network applications will be target of attacks.
In line with this, the availability of security applica-
tions is addressed by Tasch et al. [58]. The authors
state that even consolidated applications such as RESO-
NANCE [62] can have security problems, such as iden-
tity spoofing and repudiation when TLS is not available
to protect the control communication.
Integrity: several works suggest that firewalls are
more concerned with (the integrity aspects of) secu-
rity. Despite all functions that these systems can per-
form, their main goal is to maintain the integrity of the
communication link and network devices, i.e., protect
the network from illegitimate attempts to gain access to
its services [68]. Firewalls are an example of network
application that can be fully assisted by SDN because:
(i) the need of additional middleboxes to enforce poli-
cies in the network is reduced because this functionality
can be placed in the SDN control plane; (ii) the con-
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trol plane has a comprehensive view of the network;
and (iii) the management of heterogeneous devices is
abstracted by the control plane. Also, Qazi et al. [84]
present a policy security monitoring layer for efficient
middlebox-specific traffic steering. Another work that
goes in this direction is proposed by Son et al. [85].
Resolution of firewall policy violations and conflicts
are addressed by Hu et al. [70]. The authors propose the
FlowGuard framework to monitor and check network
flows in order to detect firewall policy changes when
the network state is updated. However, they identified
the following challenges with respect to the implemen-
tation of firewalls in SDN: (i) as the network state is dy-
namically changed, new configurations are frequent and
simple packet-in monitoring will not be effective for de-
tecting flow policy violations; (ii) the set-field actions
of the OpenFlow protocol enable the dynamic change
of packet headers, creating an opportunity for malicious
users to attack the network; (iii) as OpenFlow enables
the use of wildcards to match only partial header fields
of packets in these security policies, the elimination of a
flow policy can affect benign traffic; (iv) the data plane
is unable to monitor flow status, depending heavily on
the control plane, thus it is challenging to perform state-
ful packet inspection.
Intrusion Detection Systems, such as Snort2, have
been used to protect the integrity of the network in
traditional environments. SnortFlow [72] is an exten-
sion to Snort with SDN capabilities that enables the de-
tection of intrusions and malicious activities in cloud
environments. Detection mechanisms are traditionally
based on Machine Learning [86], Signatures [87] and
Entropy [88]. Shin et al. [81] group several security
needs and deliver a complete framework for security
implementation, sharing and composition of detection
modules and mitigation in a SDN. This effort enables
the evaluation of optimal mechanisms to protect the net-
work, being able to detect and manage malicious ac-
tivities. Another example of IDS with these respon-
sibilities is presented by Kumar et al. [82]. Solutions
based on packet classification using SDN are presented
by Smeliansky et al. [78] and the detection of malware
is discussed in the work of Abaid et al. [80]. Further, the
PROTOGENI framework is presented by Li et al. [83]
and serves as a tool for creating and evaluating different
types of network attacks.
However, other solutions to protect the network from
intrusions and malicious attacks are possible. Kam-
panakis et al. [74] advocate the use of moving target de-
fense (MTD) in order to protect network services when
2http://www.snort.org
malicious traffic try to compromise their integrity. The
authors conclude that SDN makes the implementation
of MTD techniques more practical, customizable and
easier to deploy. Jafarian et al. [76] present a study re-
lated to this problem and propose a technique named
random host mutation, i.e., the path between source and
target is randomized to avoid the effects of malicious
traffic.
Security threats can also compromise the integrity of
configuration messages sent by the control plane to the
data plane by modifying or introducing errors in their
content [65]. A simple solution for this challenge is
to use encryption protocols, such as TLS. Benton et
al. [59] state that the biggest concern related to secu-
rity in SDN is the protection of the communication be-
tween the control plane and the data plane. The authors
point out that the TLS protocol in the OpenFlow speci-
fication may sometimes be used incorrectly, because in
order to put TLS in practice, the network operator must
achieve security certificates for each of the devices in-
volved in the communication and manually configure
each of them. In contrast, to use plain text communica-
tion without any encryption, the network operator only
needs to configure the network controller address in the
data plane. Thus, the difficulty in deploying TLS can
discourage its use.
Confidentiality: related to the issues discussed
above, another challenge pointed out in the work of
Benton et al. [59], and uniquely related to SDN, is
called the listener mode. This existing functionality in
many switches allows the establishment of a data con-
nection in a pre-configured port without authentication.
Although it is used primarily for debugging reasons,
this connection can be used to modify rules in switches
and discover information about the network. If TLS
is not used correctly, an attacker can intercept packets
and perform network discovery based on communica-
tions observed between the control plane and the data
plane. Additionally, a switch can change rules with-
out notifying the control plane. Clearly, the issues re-
lated to TLS deployment represent a major challenge
to security in the SDN context. A possible solution to
such problems is the use of middleboxes to perform the
communication between the data plane and the con-
trol plane. Sherwood et al. [89] propose a virtualiza-
tion platform called FlowVisor that intermediates the
communication between the network controller and the
switches. Other examples of middleboxes used to en-
hance security are presented by Anwer et al. [69] and
Fayazbakhsh et al. [71]. In particular, Kreutz et al. [64]
present the vectors of the most common threats in SDN,
such as DDoS attacks, and comment on the TLS chal-
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lenges above.
Silva et al. [75] describe the use of an anti-
eavesdropping technique based on multipath routing for
SDN-based SCADA systems used in electrical smart
grids. Centered on the confidentiality of the OpenFlow
protocol, Kloti et al. [90] consider attacks that exploit
flow aggregation to discover information about the net-
work state and topology, which would not be visible
otherwise. The authors use two modeling techniques,
namely Microsoft’s STRIDE and attack trees, to iden-
tify and explore threats to SDNs. Schlesinger et al. [79]
analyze the problem of dividing the network in slices,
thereby allowing traffic isolation, which can guarantee
confidentiality in the communication.
Frequently, the mitigation mechanisms used should
install firewall rules in the data plane. Porras et al. [66]
propose a software extension to the NOX controller
called FortNOX, which is intended to avoid conflicting
rules to be installed in the data plane. FortNOX is also
used as a security policy management tool. Also in the
context of security policies, Naous et al. [73] propose
the protocol ident++ that allows the search for informa-
tion or rules placed on hosts. Ballard et al. [77] propose
the OPENSAFE and ALARMS languages to simplify
the specification of security policies using the Open-
Flow protocol. Jafarian et al. [76] present an elegant
solution for the mitigation of malicious activities and
protection of IP addresses against spoofing by enabling
the network to randomly modify the IP addresses used.
Nonrepudiality and AAA: very few works have ad-
dressed exclusively these aspects. Some firewalls deal
with these issues, but it is possible that SDN can ensure
these properties using TLS in its communication. Fur-
ther reading can be found in [91], which presents a sur-
vey discussing interesting aspects of security in SDN.
3.4. Performability
In recent years, the performability of the control
plane has been a main concern. Despite the benefits
of a centralized control logic in the SDN/OpenFlow ar-
chitecture, Curtis et al. [54] point out that the current
OpenFlow specification does not meet the demands of
high performance networks. This is mainly due to the
following reasons: (i) there is a high dependence on a
central logic and on the global view of the network; (ii)
it is possible that path latency can slow down the com-
munication between the control and data planes during
flow setup; and (iii) there is an excessive dependence on
the control plane, demanding considerable resources to
maintain this feature. To address these challenges, the
authors present DevoFlow, a modification of OpenFlow
that reduces the amount of communication between the
Table 4: SDN research efforts on Performability
SDN Planes QoS
Application plane Wei et al. [93]
Control plane Curtis et al. [54]
Veisllari et al. [46]
Egilmez et al. [94]
Akella et al. [95]
Huang et al. [96]
Xiong et al. [97]
Wang et al. [98]
Machado et al. [99]
Data plane Zhang et al. [92]
Egilmez et al. [94]
Wang et al. [98]
Machado et al. [99]
control and data planes, thereby reducing its overhead.
DevoFlow achieves this goal by handling flows in the
data plane. Additionally, Veisllari et al. [46] investigate
the performability of the control plane with respect to
scalability. Scalability is related to performance when
we consider metrics such as delay, latency and through-
put. The authors conclude that the current Internet flow
definitions have high requirements on the processing
rate of the SDN controller.
One of these requirements is the consistent popula-
tion of flow tables regarding performance in traffic man-
agement. Zhang et al. [92] address the problem of
redundant rules that can appear after successive inser-
tions of flow rules. The authors discuss a compression
method based on the combination of similar entries us-
ing techniques such as Huffman coding. Internet ap-
plications over the network have performance require-
ments with respect to the communication with the con-
trol plane. Efforts focusing on the performability of the
Northbound API are presented by Wei et al. [93], who
propose the use of caches to speed up the service of this
interface. Table 4 categorizes the major research efforts
related to performability in SDN, and next we discuss
these efforts with respect to QoS (Quality of Service).
QoS: Sonkoly et al. [100] state that SDN developed
slowly with respect to QoS support and that the current
result is “even worse” than expected. In part this oc-
curs due to several limitations of the devices present in
the data plane, which is the same reason that makes the
implementation of QoS difficult in traditional networks.
The current version of the OpenFlow protocol supports
only simple mechanisms to address QoS queues. Some
counters provided by the data plane, e.g., the number of
packets received or flow duration, can be used to pro-
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vide QoS on existing packets in the network, but are
limited and inflexible. Additionally, the manipulation of
existing switch queues is difficult because there is a lack
of advanced interfaces to access their information. One
solution is to use protocols such as OF-config, which of-
fers a management interface with NETCONF features.
Egilmez et al. [94] propose an architecture for QoS
called OpenQoS, which is used for grouping data
streams and multimedia flows in sets of traffic classes
allowing differential treatment for each type of class.
Note that QoS-based approaches are inherently depen-
dent on the queue concept and prioritization, which can
be assisted by the programmability of the control plane.
Egilmez et al. [101] address QoS for video streaming
and deal with routing issues, such as packet loss. The
authors consider large networks controlled by clusters
of network controllers, and all the controllers decide
jointly the best policy to enforce QoS in the network.
Other examples of QoS support in SDN are:
• Cloud: Akella et al. [95] address the problem of
guaranteeing QoS requirements for cloud users,
such as low delay. The most used QoS solution
for multimedia applications is to differentiate the
way in which different types of packets are for-
warded. Also, the authors study bandwidth allo-
cation for QoS using queuing techniques. The per-
formance metrics used are response time and num-
ber of hops. Another effort towards QoS in clouds
is presented by Huang et al. [96], which provide
a theoretical and experimental analysis for end-to-
end QoS provisioning;
• Data Stores: Xiong et al. [97] advocate the use
of SDN to manage the performance of distributed
queries in data stores. The authors discuss how
to control the priority of network traffic or make
bandwidth reservations using queuing theory;
• Servers: Wang et al. [98] propose an autonomic
QoS management mechanism for SDN by ex-
tending the OpenFlow and OF-Config protocols.
The authors introduce a packet context-aware QoS
model (PCaQoS) to provide self-configuration;
• Policy Based Management: Machado et al. [99]
propose a policy refinement approach for QoS
management. The authors propose a method capa-
ble of identifying QoS requirements and use PBM
(Policy Based Management) mechanisms and nat-
ural language to translate these requirements into
primitive switch configurations.
3.5. Traffic Tolerance
Traffic tolerance enables the network to withstand un-
usual traffic profiles without compromising its expected
behavior [7]. This discipline deals with traffic related
questions, such as malicious attacks and legitimate traf-
fic management. In the following, the most important
studies in this topic are discussed. Table 5 summarizes
the work presented in this section.
3.5.1. Legitimate traffic
Although protocols such as SCTCP and MP-TCP del-
egate traffic resilience to the network core, it is a some-
what limited approach because global network protec-
tion is difficult to achieve due to the lack of flexibility
of traditional architectures. An alternative is to trans-
fer this responsibility to the edge of the network, i.e.,
to improve routing algorithms in order to make traffic
management more resilient. Despite this seems more
appealing and flexible, even a simple change to routing
paths can lead to inappropriate solutions with respect to
network performance and communication delay. Tra-
ditional, non-SDN network architectures do not offer
support for advanced routing solutions, however, within
an SDN architecture, software abstractions can be cre-
ated to improve legitimate traffic resilience and complex
routing schemes can be easily deployed.
A broad discussion on routing in SDN can be seen
in the work of Rothenberg et al. [102]. According to
the authors, the OpenFlow protocol represents a real op-
portunity for the deployment and evaluation of routing
strategies. Typically, these solutions are implemented
in the control plane, i.e., the SDN controller is extended
to deal with problems such as link failure, communi-
cation delay and load distribution. Agarwal et al. [5]
deal with traffic engineering issues, but in the context
of delay and packet losses. The work supports adaptive
routing based on performance metrics, such as delay.
The authors rely on the global network view to create
a graph that represents all links available. After this, a
mathematical formulation of the routing problem con-
sidering these metrics is produced, and a Fully Polyno-
mial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) is used to
find the best solution for the problem. One advantage of
this work is that it does not require protocol changes and
can be used in scenarios where SDN is not completely
deployed. Akyildiz et al. [105] deal with similar traf-
fic issues. In general, the programmability offered by
SDN encourages the use of classical algorithms, such
as graph-based algorithms, to solve routing problems.
INFLEX is a framework that extends the network
controller to create multiple routing planes that can be
11
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Table 5: SDN research efforts on Traffic Tolerance
SDN Planes Legitimate Traffic DDoS Attacks
Application plane N/A N/A
Control plane Taveira et al. [9] Braga et al. [86]
Rothenberg et al. [102] Shin et al.[103]
Agarwal et al. [5] Michale et al. [104]
Akyildiz et al. [105] Giotis et al.[106]
Taveira et al. [9] Benton et al.[59]
Ramos et al. [107] Alcorn et al. [108]
Benson et al. [109] Belyaev et al. [110]
Raza et al. [111] Wang et al. [112]
Venmani et al. [113] Passito et al. [114]
Qazi et al.[84] Li et al. [115]
Shimim et al. [116] Shtern et al. [117]
Silva et al. [118]
Laga et al. [119]
Xiaogang et al. [120]
Rodrigues et al. [121]
Bennesby et al. [122]
Data plane Taveira et al. [9] Braga et al. [86]
Ramos et al. [107] Krishnan et al. [123]
Bensom et al. [109] Michale et al. [104]
Venmani et al. [113] Benton et al. [59]
Sgambelluri et al. [124]
switched when a challenge is observed, for example, a
link failure [9]. The core of the architecture lies on the
Differentiated Services (DS) field of the IP protocol to
create the notion of a routing plane for every packet in
the network. Every host sets the DS field properly to
guarantee that its packets will follow the same route.
Additionally, hosts can request a new plane when a fault
is observed (e.g., if no response is received after a few
seconds). Other authors, e.g., Ramos et al. [107], sim-
ilarly exploit the programmability of SDN to support
alternative communication paths.
Benson et al. [109] address new traffic engineering
strategies in data center networks to efficiently accom-
modate various types of traffic. Although the research
area of traffic engineering is not focused exclusively on
resilience, some of its concepts can be used to sup-
port resilience objectives, e.g., prioritization of traf-
fic profiles. In order to handle conflicting constraints,
such as conflicting QoS requirements, the MeasuRout-
ing framework presented by Raza et al. [111] can en-
force QoS using traffic monitors that guarantee the de-
mand of the network traffic.
With respect to link congestion, Venmani et al. [113]
use OpenFlow to provide improvements to flow routing
in backbone networks. These improvements include the
use of the network controller to generate high-level poli-
cies to notify link failures. In this case, the controller
can run a routine to recover the network back to its nor-
mal operation (e.g., calculation of new paths and link
failure detection). Sgambelluri et al. [124] remove this
responsibility from the network controller and pass it to
the data plane. The idea is to install backup rules with
low priority, thus in case an error occurs the data plane
itself can change the path used for communication. In
scenarios where the network controller is usually over-
loaded, such solutions serve as an efficient alternative
to avoid communication latency. To enforce capabili-
ties related to policy management in the performance
context, Qazi et al.[84] propose the use of middleboxes
orchestrated by SIMPLE, a policy enforcement layer
in the control plane. Additionally, the specification
of packet-forwarding policies can be assisted by high-
level languages, such as those proposed by Voellmy et
al. [125] and Foster et al. [126].
Given that one of the main benefits of SDN is to al-
low flexibility in routing, several solutions for routing
challenges have been investigated. Shimim et al. [116]
and Silva et al. [118] deal primarily with multicast rout-
ing. They suggest the use of applications on the control
plane to orchestrate flow behavior in order to provide
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multicast routing. Video routing is addressed by Laga
et al. [119] and issues related to MPLS are discussed in
the work of Xiaogang et al. [120]. Rodrigues et al. [121]
discuss the optimization of network utilization across
layers using bandwidth virtualization. The authors show
that inefficiencies exist in links of data center WANs, but
SDN can assist in addressing these restrictions. Ben-
nesby et al. [122] address the problem of inter-domain
routing with SDN support. The authors present perfor-
mance and scalability results to demonstrate that SDN
can help to mitigate the limitations of rigid BGP deploy-
ments, such as the difficulty in supporting architectural
innovation. Additionally, an overview of transport net-
works in the context of SDN is provided by Alvizu et
al. [127].
3.5.2. DDoS Attacks
According to Mehdi et al. [87], the deployment of
an anomaly detection system in the traditional network
core is difficult mainly due to the low detection rate
that these systems can provide with limited network in-
formation. In SDN, however, the control plane has a
comprehensive view of the network, which facilitates
the implementation of detection mechanisms. Mehdi et
al. [87] presents an overview of attack detection pos-
sibilities using SDN. The authors discuss four well-
known algorithms: TRW-CB, MaxEnt, RateLimit and
NETAD. Their study suggests that SDN is a platform
suitable for the mitigation of DDoS attacks, mainly be-
cause of the use of standard protocols, services and in-
terfaces, thus facilitating the deployment of new solu-
tions.
Several strategies can be used to detect and mitigate
DDoS attacks. Belyaev et al. [110] state that existing
solutions to mitigate DDoS attacks can be classified as
active (e.g., based on the use of machine learning for
detection) or survival (e.g., trying to tolerate a DDoS
attack). The latter is concerned with solutions based
on load balancing. As pure load balancing is not ef-
fective during a DDoS attack, an iterative splitting of
traffic paths where the network is overloaded may be
necessary. This can increase the chances of tolerating a
DDoS attack. For example, Wang et al. [112] present
a mechanism to protect the control path against DDoS
attacks by scaling the control channel capacity. This al-
lows the network to handle a large number of flows, and
makes the control plane more resilient.
Braga et al. [86] investigate the mitigation of DDoS
attacks using Self-Organizing-Maps (SOM), a machine
learning algorithm already used in traditional networks
but with limited effects due to the restrictions of that
architecture. Frequently, well-known solutions for tra-
ditional networks are implemented in the SDN context,
as in the work of Ramadas et al. [157]. Further, Shin et
al. [103] propose the insertion of triggers to control and
change flow dynamics in the data plane. This can be
used to expose the malicious flows for the detection and
mitigation of DDoS attacks. For example, Krishnan et
al. [123] present several detection methods and discuss
which methods can be implemented in the data plane.
Michale et al. [104] propose packet classification based
on techniques such as prefix match and flow caches, to
avoid the repeated classification of flows. Alcorn et
al. [108] present a framework to model and simulate
DoS and DDoS attacks in SDN/OpenFlow networks.
More recently, the use of information theory for
packet classification has been investigated by Giotis et
al. [106], who use entropy analysis for monitoring de-
viations in network behavior. Additionally, man-in-the-
middle attacks are discussed by Benton et al. [59], who
indicate that the adoption of TLS as a secure commu-
nication channel can present vulnerabilities. Passito et
al. [114] present a solution that allows SDN domains
to cooperate in the mitigation of DDoS attacks. Li et
al. [115] use traffic engineering techniques to reduce
the impact of a DDoS attack, and Shtern et al. [117]
address the mitigation of Low and Slow Distributed De-
nial of Service (LSDDoS), a variant of traditional DDoS
that can compromise network applications by simulat-
ing their behavior.
3.6. Disruption Tolerance
The distributed nature of network devices contributes
to the unpredictability of delay in their communication.
In addition, natural disasters, e.g., hurricanes and earth-
quakes, often compromise links, preventing communi-
cation in the affected region and causing communication
delays in other parts. Power outages and intermittent
connection can also leave part of the network without
operation. Issues related to these challenges, summa-
rized in Table 6, comprise the disruption tolerance dis-
cipline. These are discussed in the following.
Connectivity: a threat constantly faced by networks
is the disruption of the connectivity between its com-
ponents. Link disruptions due to natural disasters or
human interaction require the rapid establishment of al-
ternative routes to restore in part the services affected.
These new routes can generate bottlenecks in network
devices that face an excessive demand for data process-
ing. This might result in the delivery of degraded ser-
vices to network users. Menth et al. [158] deal with link
disruption issues and rerouting of packets in traditional
networks, and illustrate how critical these questions are
to the resilience of networks in general.
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Table 6: SDN research efforts on Disruption Tolerance
SDN Planes Connectivity Mobility Delay Energy
Application plane N/A Pupatwibul et al. [128] N/A N/A
Namal et al. [129]
Yuhong et al. [130]
SchulzZander et al. [131]
Control plane Yeganeh et al. [132] Pupatwibul et al. [128] Yeganeh et al. [132] Heller et al. [133]
Heller et al. [47] Sabbagh et al. [134] Heller et al. [47] Wang et al. [135]
Zhang et al. [92] Namal et al. [129] Hock et al. [49] Pfeiffenberger et al. [136]
Beheshti et al. [51] Sahri et al. [137] Phemius et al. [138]
Hock et al. [49] Zhipu et al. [139] Cai et al. [140]
Nguyen et al. [141] Guolin et al. [142] Rotsos et al. [143]
Stephens et al. [144] Jeon et al. [145] Mahmoodi et al. [146]
Borokhovich et al. [147] Yuhong et al. [130]
Shengli et al. [148]
Ding et al. [149]
SchulzZander et al. [131]
Lara et al. [150]
Jagadeesan et al. [151]
Sperotto et al. [152]
Giust et al. [153]
Kyoungjae et al. [154]
Hyunsik et al. [155]
Data plane N/A Guolin et al. [142] N/A Heller et al. [133]
Shengli et al. [148]
Lara et al. [150]
SeongMun et al. [156]
Despite the fact that SDN is appropriate for innova-
tion of the network control tasks, the problems faced by
traditional IP networks persist even when we consider
the full potential of this new approach [132]. A cen-
tralized control plane with an overview of the network
topology has instigated studies that focus on new solu-
tions for legacy problems in distributed systems, such
as link failure. However, as in SDN the responsibility
for defining the communication paths between network
components lies with the network controller, a new cat-
egory of problems arises that are related to the availabil-
ity of this component.
The controller is responsible for defining how packets
will be forwarded at the data plane. Thus, the protec-
tion of the controller is the first critical point to address.
Heller et al. [47] and Zhang et al. [92] deal with the
controller placement problem. Their objective is to en-
sure there is connectivity between the controller and the
switches. Beheshti et al. [51] also tackle this problem,
but additionally deal with traffic control issues, such as
link disruption and component failure. Hock et al. [49]
present a framework with the same objectives, but also
considering metrics such as latency, component failures
and load balancing. Their major conclusion is the im-
possibility of finding an optimal solution to place the
controller that satisfies various different criteria, e.g.,
latency and backup communication. Note that this re-
silience discipline is strongly related to dependability.
Several studies focused on links and routing protec-
tion are available. Nguyen et al. [141] define algorithms
for finding alternative paths if a link disruption occurs in
the network; Stephens et al. [144] present an architec-
ture called Plinko, which is provably resilient to t link
failures when the size of flow tables in the data plane
is sufficiently large to accommodate backup flow rules;
Borokhovich et al. [147] use graph theory to model the
network as a graph and run algorithms such as Depth-
first search (DFS) and Breadth-first search (BFS) to an-
alyze the routing problem and ensure connectivity when
a failure occurs.
Delay: communication delays can occur due to the
rupture of intermediate links and, to ensure connectivity,
alternative communication paths can be used. Link de-
lays resulting from congestion due to the intensive use
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of network resources may be difficult to conceal [159].
When the problem is less severe, routing algorithms
may solve part of the problem, as shown by Heller
et al. [47] and Hock et al. [49]. These efforts inves-
tigate the influence that the position of the controller
has on the communication latency between controller
and switch. Phemius et al. [138] point out that switch
buffers in the data plane play an important role in the
overall performance of the network.
Another possible solution is to exploit parallelism to
avoid network delay, as proposed by Cai et al. [140].
Their system implements a middlebox that handles re-
quests to the controller in parallel and uses alternative
paths to communicate. The same principle can be used
in the OFLOPS platform [143], which offers support for
the rapid development and test of network components.
Further, in order to reduce the impact of communication
delay on the performance of the network, Mahmoodi et
al. [146] propose a modular redesign of the intermediate
links between the core and mobile networks to handle
increasing traffic volumes.
Mobility: in the context of wireless networks, mo-
bility is an important characteristic for the convenience
of users. Resilience strategies may use the concept of
mobility in the face of a challenge, e.g., a device may
need to temporarily migrate to another region until nor-
mal service is re-established. Challenges related to user
mobility are summarized in the work of Pupatwibul et
al. [128], where the authors recognize that OpenFlow is
a suitable technology for dealing with mobility issues.
Sabbagh et al. [134] propose a solution based on re-
programming OpenFlow switches to solve the problem
of relocation rules in order to maintain communication
when the user moves from one point to another in net-
work.
Namal et al. [129] present an architecture called
OpenFlow Host Identity Protocol (OFHIP), which pro-
vides a mechanism for switches to change their IP ad-
dresses due to malicious attacks. Further, Sahri et
al. [137] study failures of network components mov-
ing in the communication path. Despite the fact that
these solutions are not exclusively focused on mobility,
they use related concepts to mitigate failures. A few
works address mobility in different contexts. Guolin et
al. [142] define an architecture for heterogeneous radio
access networks and deal with aspects of mobility, e.g.,
QoS. Other examples are the works of Jeon et al. [145],
Yuhong et al. [130], Shengli et al. [148] and Ding et
al. [149], which advocate that SDN can be used for mo-
bility. SchulzZander et al. [131] discuss the feasibil-
ity of Wi-Fi deployments in the SDN context. Lara et
al. [150] propose MobileFirst, a clean-slate monitoring
architecture that addresses concepts such as communi-
cation delay using routing based on VLAN tags. Fur-
ther information about wireless and SDN can be found
in the work of Jagadeesan et al. [151] and SeongMun et
al. [156].
SDN offers an opportunity to facilitate the treatment
of challenges in mobile networks, such as mobility man-
agement. Traditional solutions present limitations re-
lated to, for example, routing and continuity of active
sessions. The use of decentralized device anchors repre-
sents an alternative to address these limitations. Further,
the use of DMM (Distributed Mobility Management) in
SDN has been advocated by Sperotto et al. [152] and in
IETF proposals [153, 154, 155]. SDN can assist in mit-
igating these issues as it provides a flexible architecture
for the deployment of network protocols and applica-
tions.
Energy: computer networks often demand scalable
and massive services, which can give rise to challenges
related to energy. Current data centers consume a large
amount of energy and according to [133], energy is-
sues in data centers are an important research topic.
Briefly, the authors use techniques to dynamically adapt
the power consumption in a data center network. One
trend observed with respect to energy in the SDN con-
text is that few studies are focused purely on energy is-
sues. Some references are related to dependability when
equipment failure is related to lack of power. These
works were discussed in previous sections, since they
are covered by other resilience disciplines.
Another study addressing energy aspects is presented
by Wang et al. [135], which optimizes energy consump-
tion by using different routing algorithms. The knowl-
edge about the amount of energy spent by each device in
the network to enforce QoS can also be used for energy
saving purposes. Also, Pfeiffenberger et al. [136] advo-
cate that SDN can be used to improve the management
of energy aspects in communication networks.
The most studied topics about energy include opti-
mization of energy consumption in the network and net-
work resilience when power outages occur. The con-
sequence of challenges associated with energy issues
is link disruption. Thus, although energy issues are
relevant in other disciplines discussed in this survey,
these aspects are mostly related to ensuring connectivity
among devices and disruption tolerance [7].
4. SDN Resilience: Solutions and Challenges
The number of papers and research efforts that ad-
dress different aspects of resilience in SDN is rapidly
growing. This section discusses specific challenges and
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Figure 3: Summary of resilience disciplines, major challenges and areas of interest, and concrete techniques
some of the major issues current research addresses.
This is done with a focus on the identified areas and re-
silience disciplines that were introduced earlier. Subse-
quently, we present a summary of open research issues
and areas that need further work.
4.1. Summary of challenges and current solutions
Figure 3 summarizes the set of identified problems
and challenges, according to the different areas and re-
silience disciplines. At the top of the diagram, the cir-
cles represent the six general resilience disciplines, and
at the level below the major challenges and prominent
research areas that are related to each resilience disci-
pline are depicted. Under each of the challenges, ex-
amples of the various techniques, approaches, and con-
crete instantiations indicate the specific research focus
related to the different challenges. They represent the
issues most commonly addressed within the discussed
literature.
The modular architecture of SDN enables more flex-
ible ways to manage traffic flows [10]. Consequently,
resilience solutions based on Routing Applications are
employed in several disciplines (e.g., they are being
used in the context of Performability, Traffic Tolerance
and Disruption Tolerance). For instance, backup paths
and multipath routing can be used to protect the commu-
nication network from link disruption and energy out-
ages [136]. Performability also relies on traffic engi-
neering techniques and load balancing to enforce QoS
requirements [96]. Further, Policy Based Management
can be used to add flexibility to these solutions [99].
Such schemes are usually implemented through exten-
sions of the control plane with applications that can
monitor and manage traffic via the OpenFlow protocol.
Software abstractions, such as topology graphs, can be
used to simplify the management of traffic flows and
routing [19], thus enabling the use of shortest paths and
minimum spanning trees to find optimal solutions for
traffic routing.
In the context of Infrastructure Planning the con-
troller placement problem plays an important role.
Since it shares similarity with the classic facility loca-
tion optimization problem [160], several proposed solu-
tions use a graph representations of the network topol-
ogy to determine the optimal placement of network
controllers [47, 49]. Also, solutions based on hard-
ware and software redundancy have been widely inves-
tigated [35]. This is due to the fact that SDN offers a
flexible architecture to manage redundant devices [30].
Further, schemes such as consensus algorithms to elect
a new replica in case of a failure help to maintain con-
sistency between components and their replicas [161].
In wireless networks, research indicates that SDN can
assist with the implementation of solutions to guarantee
connectivity between devices, e.g., through software ab-
stractions to change IP addresses of devices that migrate
and re-route flows to guarantee communication [76].
In the investigated papers Fault Management of-
ten exploits the programmability features offered by
the control plane, which enables the implementation
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Table 7: Key findings observed about the current research on resilience in SDN
Discipline Key aspects observed
Survivability (i) there are cost issues that prevent the deployment of fully fault tolerant systems; (ii) management requirements
of redundant devices can be high, for example, to maintain their consistency;
Dependability (i) controller placement is the most studied problem in this area; (ii) maintainability is an uncovered field that
can give rise to interesting research, for example, with the addition of a dedicated management plane to the SDN
architecture;
Security (i) several works focus on porting solutions used in traditional networks (e.g., firewalls, IDSes) to SDN. Their
main goal is to implement these techniques with more flexibility; (ii) mis-configurations and human-dependence
in the use of TLS between the controller and switches can compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the
communication;
Performability (i) although QoS support in SDN is far from optimal, several solutions are more flexible than existing ones in
traditional networks; (ii) the controller placement is an issue that can impact communication delay, latency and
throughput of the network;
Traffic Tolerance (i) this is the most developed resilience discipline because the SDN architecture has been traditionally concerned
with the innovation of routing protocols; (ii) well-known solutions to mitigate DDoS attacks can be successfully
implemented in SDN;
Disruption Tolerance (i) again, controller placement is critical for protecting the network from disruption; (ii) solutions related to
survivability are frequently used, such as path redundancy and link redundancy;
of network applications related to software debug-
ging [33]. Also, there are sophisticated monitoring ap-
plications capable of collecting information about topol-
ogy changes, device crashes and link disruptions. These
applications might also perform fault isolation, thereby
creating a reliable environment for fault detection and
mitigation. The use of group tables [162] in an Open-
Flow switch is an example of how SDN can simplify
capacity planning, by enabling the definition of backup
flow rules in the switch.
Resilience approaches that rely upon Network Mea-
surement are the most effective when they focus on
measuring latency, throughput and delay. These met-
rics can be used for assessing QoS and the degree of
dependability that the network can offer.
The work on Security Applications can be divided
into two broad sets: (i) security solutions built on top
of SDN and (ii) security of the SDN architecture itself.
Within the first group, there are several implementations
of firewalls and IDSes that can perform their functions
more flexibly and with lower management cost [70].
Within the second group, research is focused on mit-
igating intrusions in the control plane; vulnerabilities
in the TLS protocol; and protecting the control plane
against malicious attacks using network-wide policies
and moving target defense [74].
Finally, there is a large amount of work on Anomaly
Detection, which has a strong relationship with the
Security discipline, but also plays an important role
in the Traffic Tolerance discipline. Anomaly detec-
tion schemes specific to SDN rely on a global network
view to collect flow statistics and perform packet sam-
pling. Most of these solutions rely on machine learning,
information theory and digital signal processing tech-
niques [163].
Ultimately, the resilience challenges observed can be
divided into two classes. The first class refers to chal-
lenges related to the SDN architecture itself indepen-
dently of any given implementation (e.g., related to in-
frastructure planning and network measurement). For
example, the controller placement is a theoretical prob-
lem that is relevant regardless of the controller imple-
mentation. The second class subsumes resilience chal-
lenges that depend on specific SDN implementations
(e.g., routing and security applications). In this case,
the solutions in the literature are frequently based on
the OpenFlow specification or highly dependent on the
functionality provided by the controller implementa-
tion.
4.2. Open research questions and lessons learned
Several research questions related to resilience in
SDN remain open. For example, high hardware costs
related to fully fault tolerant systems can be partially
mitigated in this scenario through the use of virtualized
infrastructures. In this context, Network Functions Vir-
tualization (NFV) [164] in the application plane can as-
sist the development of new solutions in this area. There
is also no real resilience metrics related to software im-
plementations and their quality. Thus, Software Engi-
neering practices could be a source for such new met-
rics to ensure a methodology for software implemen-
tations. Additionally, emerging types of traffic profiles
suggest that applications related to traffic classification
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will be very useful for future SDN environments. This
should be an active area of research for the next years,
as well as the development of monitoring applications
that rely on the global network view supported by the
SDN architecture. Finally, the initial proposal of the
OpenFlow protocol supports limited QoS capabilities,
but the development of new protocols can create novel
ways to tag flows, enabling sophisticated applications
to enforce QoS in the network. Table 7 highlights these
points and summarizes the main lessons learned from
this study. Note that in addition to specific issues re-
lated to these individual disciplines, there is also the
need to address resilience challenges that span across
several disciplines. This might require the co-ordination
of resilience mechanisms that operate at different layers
and systems elements (i.e., multi-level resilience), cor-
relating data and also taking coordinated actions. Ulti-
mately, an overall resilience architecture would then be
able to discover network and systems anomalies more
quickly, and enforce countermeasures at the most ap-
propriate locations.
5. Concluding Remarks
Resilience in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is
the subject of intense investigation by the academic and
industrial community in general. As SDN is a rela-
tively new concept, a wide range of solutions to clas-
sical network problems have been revisited using this
architecture, and many problems continue to be chal-
lenging. In this article, we have presented a comprehen-
sive survey on the support for resilience in the SDN ar-
chitecture, categorizing the existing research efforts on
resilience across the different SDN conceptual planes.
Furthermore, this survey has presented an overall view
of resilience research, describing the trends and key as-
pects observed, as well as the evolution of this area since
2008, when the widely-adopted OpenFlow protocol was
proposed.
The number of research projects that address re-
silience aspects in SDN has grown significantly. This
can be observed by the number of papers included in
our survey, and also by the number of research calls
issued in this topic recently. The main result of our
survey is a comprehensive view of the research space
in SDN resilience demonstrating that (i) the data plane
can be protected against link disruption, device failures
and malicious attacks using applications placed in the
control or application planes; (ii) the control plane has
resilience requirements related to the consistency be-
tween several network controller instances, the security
of these devices and general fault management over the
entire network. There are several ways to decide where
network controllers will be placed and this decision is
critical for network operation. Additional controllers
may be deployed according to security and survivability
requirements; (iii) the application plane can accommo-
date several types of network applications, thus promot-
ing research on more sophisticated resilience systems to
protect the network against a wide range of challenges.
High-level policy languages, such as Procera [125] and
Pyretic [126], and troubleshooting systems can also be
used to facilitate these tasks.
We emphasize that many of the resilience challenges
are due to limitations in the implementation of the com-
ponents used to realize the SDN paradigm. For exam-
ple, (i) the OpenFlow protocol can be unsafe if TLS is
not set up correctly; (ii) the Floodlight controller ex-
poses almost all of its functionality through a REST API
(possibly allowing illegitimate applications to gather
network data); and (iii) the listener mode functional-
ity (present in many OpenFlow switches) may allow
the establishment of connections in a pre-configured
port without authentication. Despite the efforts re-
ported in this survey, there are still a number of open
issues related to the resilience disciplines investigated,
such as the co-ordination of different types of resilience
schemes regarding performance and consistency. Con-
sequently, research that takes a more systematic view
of resilience systems is required (e.g., considering re-
silience aspects across different system layers). This
article assists in the identification of these aspects that
demand further research.
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